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INTRODUCTION
First impressions are mistaken impressions—or so says common wisdom.
Most of the time, of course, common wisdom is correct. But every once in a
while, a first impression conveys—in a flash, in a single instant—a truth about
a person that is only burnished and deepened by time and experience. That is the
case with respect to my first impression of Michael Perry.
During a year I spent as a student in Hyde Park in the mid-1980s, I wandered
into an interdisciplinary seminar on law and religion that Perry (then a professor
at Northwestern Law School) was teaching with Robin Lovin (then on the
faculty of the University of Chicago Divinity School). Perry immediately struck
me as someone who fully integrated in both mind and heart the disciplines by
which I was most fascinated. He was an established law professor with a
specialization in constitutional law. At the same time, he was also thoroughly
knowledgeable about debates in both philosophy and theology regarding the
nature of human dignity, the importance of human sociality, and the challenges
of living together with peacefulness and respect in a pluralistic society. He was
open-minded, dialogical, and respectful of different views, even as he vigorously
defended his own positions.
Most importantly, as I came to realize later, Michael Perry was committed
to treating law as an equal conversation partner with the humanities, rather than
merely as an instrument to implement the insights of the social sciences. During
the mid-1980s, in the heyday of “law and economics” scholarship at the
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University Chicago,1 this commitment struck me as equally revolutionary and
compelling. Perry was also dedicated to treating the insights of religious
traditions as fully capable of engaging with the secular disciplines of law,
politics, and philosophy. He read Theological Studies (the most important
American journal of Catholic theology) as well as the Harvard Law Review.
In my view, Perry’s genuine respect for religious traditions as loci of
intellectual inquiry and debate is what sets him apart from many other scholars—
both religious and secular—in the field of law and religion. It is not uncommon
for First Amendment specialists, including scholars and activists, to treat
“religion” as an undifferentiated lump of controversial moral propositions held
by one or more clusters of citizens; by their reckoning, both the lump of
propositions and the citizens are to be managed with the tools of the law rather
than substantively engaged on their merits. Some secular First Amendment
scholars see those who believe in religious propositions as threatening the liberal
polity,2 while some religious First Amendment scholars see religious believers
as threatened by liberalism and in need of protection against encroaching
secularism.3
In my view, however, too few First Amendment scholars are inclined to see
these propositions as calling for critical engagement on terms drawn from the
religious tradition itself.4 In one respect, their approach is understandable, since
established First Amendment jurisprudence does not permit judges to inquire
into the merits of positions held by litigants on religious grounds. But legal
scholars are not judges. They are free to enter discussion with academic
theologians and religious ethicists who regularly question, reformulate, define,
and distinguish the commitments of the faith communities to which they belong
in much the same way that academic lawyers engage with the secular
community. In retrospect, I now recognize that it is because Perry views
Christian theological ethics as a living, developing tradition of inquiry rather
than a hermetically sealed capsule of doctrines that he could effectively co-teach
a doctoral seminar in the Divinity School with Robin Lovin. In fact, for many
1
For a more detailed survey on the development of law and economics scholarship, see, e.g., GEORGE
L. PRIEST, THE RISE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (2020).
2
See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION?, at xvii–xix (2013).
3
See, e.g., KEN STARR, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN CRISIS: EXERCISING YOUR FAITH IN AN AGE OF
UNCERTAINTY (2021).
4
In this regard, Perry’s work bears a great deal of resemblance to that of John T. Noonan, Jr., who treats
both religious and legal traditions as capable of internal development. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH
THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING (2005). I explore
Noonan’s thought on development and tradition in CATHLEEN KAVENY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LAW:
RELIGIOUS MORALISTS AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 3–34 (2018).
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years, Perry was a regular participant in the annual meeting of the Society of
Christian Ethics, a major venue for academic Christian moralists to reflect
critically and constructively on their tradition.5
In Perry’s hands, religious traditions are analogous to legal traditions in two
ways. First, in both cases, many people mistakenly believe that that the
deliverances of both sets of traditions are simply self-interpreting commands
backed by threats, whether those threats come from an omnipotent deity or a
political ruler that is powerful enough to compel obedience.6 Second, despite
what these people think, both law and religion actually involve traditions of
inquiry characterized by complicated processes of reasoning.7 In both cases,
even the process of recognizing a command as coming from the highest source,
whether that source be the word of God or the words of a constitution, is not
without complication and controversy. Consequently, studying both kinds of
tradition together was not simply an idiosyncrasy. Rather, it was a path to
intellectual enrichment.
For these reasons, Michael Perry has been not only a mentor to me but also
a role model. In fact, it is precisely because he was, and remains, a role model
that he has been such a powerful mentor. From the time I was an undergraduate
at Princeton, I not only wanted to pursue the fields of law and ethics but I also
wanted to integrate them. But what does it really mean to integrate these fields?
Is “interdisciplinary” the equivalent of “integrative”? Or does integrative
scholarship require something more? I was not able to articulate the answer to
these questions at the time, but I instinctively recognized that Perry exemplified
the type of scholar I aspired to be.

5
Descriptions of the purposes, history, and programs of the Society of Christian Ethics can all be found
at its website. About the Society of Christian Ethics, THE SOC’Y OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS, https://www.scethics.org/
(last visited May 10, 2022).
6
In religious studies, this idea comes from divine command ethics, whose fundamental insight is that
forms of activity are good or bad because they are commanded or forbidden by God. There are many
sophisticated forms of divine command ethics, which give human reason an important (but subordinate) role in
moral decision-making. At the same time, many people hold a crude view of what it means to identify and follow
a divine command. In the twentieth century, Christian divine command ethics is associated with the Protestant
theologian Karl Barth. See, e.g., WILLIAM WERPEHOWSKI, KARL BARTH AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 3–57 (2010).
In English legal theory, the idea that law is a command backed by the threat of a sovereign was given prominence
by John Austin, sparking the development of legal positivism. There are many sophisticated forms of legal
positivism that recognize the role of moral judgment in a legal system. See, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO LEGAL POSITIVISM (Torben Spaak & Patricia Mindus eds., 2021); see also Wilfred E. Rumble, Legal
Positivism of John Austin and the Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 986 (1981)
(discussing the influence of English legal positivism in the United States).
7
For an account of both religion and law as traditions, see KAVENY, supra note 4, at 3–34.
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As I reflect now on Perry’s scholarship, his teachings, and his life, I would
say that integrative academic work has three distinct components. First, it not
only draws from two or more disciplines but also aims to create a conversation
among those disciplines. Consequently, integrative scholarship takes care to
explain the presuppositions of one field to practitioners of the other(s) so that all
are equipped to carry out a common discussion. I remember vividly Perry’s
efforts to ensure that the law students in the interdisciplinary seminar understood
how theology worked, while the theology students acquired a basic grasp of
legal reasoning.
Second, scholarship that is integrative across disciplines recognizes the
arguments internal to each discipline and is sensitive to the changing shape of
the consensus with each discipline.8 Integrative scholarship does not take an
isolated insight or proposition from one discipline and bring it into another field
of inquiry, as if one were carrying a tightly wrapped package across a border.
Not content merely to take the answers from one discipline into another,
integrative scholarship shows how the questions that one discipline asks, and the
presuppositions it brings to them, can change the shape of the discussion in
another field—and vice versa.
Third, in my view, the work of a scholar dedicated to integrative scholarship
evinces a kind of integration in the components of his or her own work. Years
of reading intensively and extensively across disciplinary boundaries creates an
expansiveness in both thought and writing. It generates an impetus to cast
questions and concerns not in the terms of one field or the other, but in the terms
of a unique and rich fusion of both. A scholar determined to live his or her
intellectual life traversing disciplinary boundaries produces a body of work that
is marked by those choices in a way that is far more radical than simply raiding
another discipline for one or two helpful concepts (for example, raiding
economics for the concept of Pareto optimality).9
My purpose in the Essay is to explore the integrative nature of Perry’s
writings. In Part I, I look at the three major foci of Perry’s work, drawing out
their interconnections and, more broadly, their normative assumptions about
human beings and society. I argue that Perry’s approach to constitutional
interpretation, commitment to global human rights, and understanding of the
8
See, e.g., THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, at v (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (discussing the evolution of economic development models and their related
legal reform efforts).
9
For an overview of Pareto optimality, see Pareto Optimality, Science Direct, https://www.sciencedirect.
com/topics/engineering/pareto-optimality (last visited May 10, 2022).
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place of religion in the American public square depend upon and instantiate his
view of human beings as bearers of an inherent dignity and as individuals who
express that dignity in a range of social relationships, which are facilitated and
protected by human rights. Perry’s work across all three spheres of his interests
depends upon a robust political anthropology.
In Part II, I begin to show the relevance and power of Perry’s approach by
examining the broader legal and social context in which it operates. The
contemporary culture wars have, in my view, splintered the practice of American
constitutional interpretation. More specifically, they have resulted in a firmly
bifurcated approach to the jurisprudence of due process rights that appears
rigidly divided along political ideological lines.10 I examine the standoff that has
developed in contemporary Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which
centers on the famous “Mystery Passage” extolling human autonomy and moral
self-creation that appears in the majority opinion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.11 One side of the standoff, represented by Washington v. Glucksberg,
downplays the importance of moral self-creation in declining to find a
constitutionally protected right to assisted suicide.12 The other side, found in
Obergefell v. Hodges, emphasizes the importance of moral self-creation in
justifying the extension of constitutional protection to same-sex marriage.13
In my view, the conflicting approaches in Glucksberg and Obergefell have
brought Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to an impasse. In Part III, I show
that Perry’s integrative approach offers us a way beyond that impasse by
overcoming a flaw ironically shared by both contesting approaches. Despite
their differences, neither the Glucksberg majority nor the Obergefell majority
acknowledges that judges need to incorporate evolving, communally articulated
social and moral norms in their judgments of constitutional law. Instead, they
each tend to point to a different external locus of moral authority. The
Glucksberg majority prioritizes the moral judgments made in the past.14 If the
Framers prohibited certain behavior, such as suicide, then it is not for
contemporary constitutional interpreters to gainsay them.15 In contrast,
Obergefell gives precedence to the moral judgments made by the contemporary,
autonomous, self-creating individual.16 If an individual decides that self-creation

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

See infra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
521 U.S. 702, 735–36 (1997).
576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21.
Id. at 719.
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 660–61.
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requires a certain pattern of life, such as same-sex marriage, then it is not the
task of constitutional interpreters to allow them to be thwarted.
Michael Perry offers a way beyond this impasse by recognizing that the
constitutional interpretation is a task of political morality.17 The justices cannot
offload, or pretend to offload, this task by pointing to an external data point that
gives them the political moral judgment they need, whether that externality be
the past or the contemporary, isolated individual. Perry’s work highlights and
acknowledges the communally informed moral-political judgments that are at
stake in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.18 He recognizes that what is at
stake in constitutional interpretation is not just a political process but also a
political vision about how fellow members of the community are to treat one
another as brothers and sisters who have much in common and also who disagree
about much as well.19 Perry’s ability to draw on different sources and
perspectives allows him to cut across rigid jurisprudential and ideological lines
in his approach to constitutional controversies, such as abortion and same-sex
marriage. In so doing, he may be able to reach the significant portion of
Americans in the political and moral middle who do not line up fully behind
either side in the culture wars.
I.

AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO SCHOLARSHIP

As Perry himself has observed (in the “Brief Autobiographical Statement”
he provided to the authors of this Festschrift), his work over the past four
decades has centered around three basic areas: (1) constitutional law; (2) human
rights in a global perspective; and (3) political morality in a liberal democracy,
in all of which he attends to the intersection of law and religion.20 It is possible
to treat these broad subject areas as autonomous fields of inquiry. Many scholars
do. Yet, as Perry’s later work makes increasingly clear, his normative
commitments in each of these areas affect how he construes the nature, purpose,
and fundamental tasks of the other fields. Moreover, the interconnections in the
three facets of his work draw from and strengthen a coherent moral and social
anthropology that animates Perry’s work as a whole.
Let us begin with Perry’s approach to constitutional law. Perry sketches his
mature theory of constitutional adjudication in a democracy in Chapter Five of
17
18
19
20

author).

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra notes 154–56 and accompanying text.
Michael Perry, Brief Autobiographical Statement (Oct. 6, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
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his latest book, A Global Political Morality.21 His approach exemplifies a
balance of realism and idealism. Ideally, Perry would endorse a “weak form” of
judicial review in a well-functioning democracy—a form that would give
lawmakers the right to overrule or disregard a court’s interpretation of the
constitution.22 Yet, he recognizes that in the United States, “strong form” judicial
review is a deeply entrenched practice: the Supreme Court of the United States
(SCOTUS) “exercises the power of judicial ultimacy: [that is,] the power to have
what is, as a practical matter, the last word when ruling that a law is
unconstitutional.”23 At the same time, however, Perry maintains that the use of
this power is not untrammeled, but is instead subject to norms of political
morality. In his view, the relevant norms are drawn not only from the U.S.
Constitution itself but also from the morality of human rights and, in particular,
the right to democratic governance.24
Recognizing the tension between strong-form judicial review and the
sovereignty of the people, Perry articulates his approach to constitutional
interpretation, maintaining that SCOTUS can and should “proceed
deferentially” when presented with a claim that the government has violated a
constitutional norm.25 The deference Perry calls for extends to two judgments:
(1) whether the norm allegedly violated is in fact a constitutional norm, and (2)
assuming it was, whether the governmental action actually violated that norm.26
More specifically, Perry maintains that in most cases, SCOTUS should uphold
the challenged legislation if there is a reasonable argument that either (1) the
norm in question is not a constitutional norm under his “General Principle” of

21
MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY,
CONSTITUTIONALISM 96–97 (2017).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 98.
24
Id. at 99.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 108–11.

AND
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constitutional interpretation,27 or (2) the norm, even if it is a constitutional norm,
was not violated.28
But Perry’s “General Principle” is subject to a very important “Exception.”
Perry argues that if a case raises a claim that “is part of the morality of human
rights [that] is claimed to have constitutional status,” then the presumptions are
partially reversed.29 SCOTUS should vindicate the right hypothetically if there
is a reasonable argument that the human rights claim is a constitutionally
protected right.30 At the same time, Perry does not alter the requirement that
SCOTUS should uphold the challenged law or other act if there is a reasonable
argument that it does not violate the constitutional right in question.31
27

Perry defines a constitutional norm in two ways:
First. N is a constitutional norm if constitutional enactors made N a constitutional norm—if they
entrenched N in the Constitution of the United States; if other later enactors did not entrench in
the Constitution a norm that supersedes N; and if no norm that supersedes N has become
constitutional bedrock. . . . Second. N is a constitutional norm if N is constitutional bedrock—if
N is a bedrock feature of the constitutional law of the United States—in this sense: N has become,
in the words of Robert Bork, “so embedded in the life of the nation, so accepted by the society,
so fundamental to the private and public expectations of individuals and institutions,” that
SCOTUS should and almost certainly will continue to deem N constitutionally authoritative even
if it is open to serious question whether enactors ever entrenched N in the Constitution.

Id. at 108–09.
28
Id. at 108.
29
Id. at 111 (emphasis omitted). Perry writes the following:
In this section, I defend an exception (‘the Exception’) to the General Principle. If in a case before
SCOTUS a right that is part of the morality of human rights is claimed to have constitutional
status, SCOTUS should rule that the right has such status if the judgment is reasonable that one
of the two conditions specified in the preceding section—at least one—is satisfied.
Id.
30

Perry argues that vindication would better coordinate constitutional law with the morality of human

rights:
The fundamental rationale for the General Principle is that by exercising the power of judicial
review according to the General Principle, SCOTUS would bring the constitutional law of the
United States into closer alignment with the morality of human rights; SCOTUS would reduce—
not eliminate, but reduce—the extent to which the constitutional law of the United States is
morally problematic, as evaluated from the perspective of human rights—from the perspective,
in particular, of the human right to democratic governance, a core aspect of which is the
presumptive right of a majority to prevail. But the very same rationale supports the exception,
because by exercising the power of judicial review according to the Exception, SCOTUS would
bring the constitutional law of the United States into closer alignment with the morality of human
rights.
Id.
31
Application of the General Principle, therefore, turns on the argument of whether a constitutional norm
was violated, not simply whether there was a constitutional norm:

Assume that even if it is well established that the norm is a constitutional norm, there is a serious
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In Perry’s analytical matrix, then, judges face two key questions: (1) how to
identify a constitutional norm, and (2) how to identify a human rights claim.
Regarding the first question, Perry outlines two paths for an alleged
constitutional right to achieve the status of a constitutional norm. First, a norm
is a constitutional norm if “constitutional enactors made it a constitutional norm”
and it has been superseded neither by amendment nor by the development of a
norm that itself counts as “constitutional bedrock.”32 This last phrase points to
the second path for a norm to achieve constitutionally protected status. Even if
not enacted by the Framers, a norm can be constitutionally protected if it has
been accepted as “part of the fabric of American life” and for that reason has
been incorporated into the bedrock of the constitutional tradition.33
Perry identifies himself as an originalist in his approach to constitutional
interpretation.34 In one sense, of course, this self-description is accurate. Perry
pays careful attention to the text of the Constitution, as well as to the meaning
the text would have conveyed at the time of the Framing.35 In another sense,
however, the originalist label is misleading because Perry does not interpret the
text solely in light of his best reconstitution of the Framers’ intentions.36 Nor
does he insist on finding that meaning in the broader philosophical and
question whether the challenged government action violates the norm. I argued in the preceding
section of this chapter that when confronted with that question, SCOTUS should rule in the
negative if there is room for a reasonable difference in judgment about whether the challenged
government action violates the norm. Nothing I have said in this section supports an exception to
that conclusion. Even if the norm that the challenged government action is claimed to violate is
a constitutional right that is part of the morality of human rights, SCOTUS should rule in the
negative on the question whether the challenged governmental action violates the right if there is
room for a reasonable difference in judgments about whether the challenged government action
violates the right—if, that is, the judgment is reasonable that the challenged government action
does not violate the right.
Id. at 112–13 (emphasis omitted).
32
Id. at 108.
33
Id. at 109.
34
Perry carefully qualifies what he means by the term “originalist”:
More than one religion marches under the banner of “originalism”. . . . I want to stress,
therefore—before I am mistakenly praised by some for having saved my soul and condemned by
others for having lost it—that the originalist approach I elaborate and defend . . . is not the
originalist approach usually associated with “conservative” attacks on the modern Supreme
Court.
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 9 (1994) (emphasis omitted). Indeed,
Perry returns to this distinction many times throughout the chapters of the book to extract “originalism” from
the popular association with conservatism.
35
Id. at 8.
36
On Perry’s shift in perspective, see Frederick M. Gedicks, Conservatives, Liberals, Romantics: The
Persistent Quest for Certainty in Constitutional Interpretation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 613, 614 (1997).
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theological commitment likely to have been dominant at the time of the Framing,
such as Protestant congregationalism and a nebulous form of deism. Instead,
Perry configures and interprets the requirements of the Constitution within the
broader normative context of a contemporary global human rights framework.
In fact, he views the enactment of the Constitution, particularly the Bill of
Rights, as a major step component in the development of that framework.
Consequently, the Constitution stands at the intersection of two traditions of
interpretation—constitutionalism and human rights morality—and is able to be
drawn upon and required to be accountable to both. These two traditions, rightly
understood, are mutually implicating and supporting in at least three ways.
First, according to Perry, a global human rights framework serves first to
justify and contextualize the American practice of constitutional interpretation.
Perry writes the following:
A democracy should both entrench in its fundamental law the human
rights to which it is (or professes to be) committed and authorize its
courts to protect the rights by enforcing them. Thus understood,
constitutionalism so strongly complements the political morality of
human rights that we may fairly regard it as an integral part of that
morality.37

Second, and related, for Perry, a global human rights framework supports
and helps guide the interpretation of key structural aspects of the American
constitutional framework. The Constitution’s establishment of several layers of
representative democracy instantiates the global human right of democratic
governance, including the right to vote.38 The First Amendment right of freedom
of expression operationalizes the fundamental human right of intellectual
freedom, of which the aspects of inquiry, discussion, and debate are essential to
the flourishing of democratic government.39 Other constitutional rights, such as
the right to equal protection of the law, specify the fundamental underpinning of
democratic rule: the right to moral equality.40 It is only because every human
being is entitled “to be treated as the moral equal of every other human being”41
that it makes sense to organize ourselves in a democratic polity in the first place.

37

PERRY, supra note 21, at 89–90.
Cf. id. at 48–52 (discussing principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that mirror the
government envisioned by the U.S. Constitution).
39
Cf. id. at 52–55 (discussing rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that are very similar
to those in the U.S. Constitution).
40
Id. at 55–62.
41
Id. at 56.
38
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Other rights in the Constitution limit the reach of democratic power in order
to preserve the equal moral dignity of each person.42 Perry casts the First
Amendment religion clauses in terms of the global human right of religious and
moral freedom.43 Because he sees the right of religious freedom as so intimately
connected with individual moral dignity, he calls for a broad interpretation of
that right, which he interprets as covering acts or omissions with “a religious or
spiritual essence.”44 He asks, for example, “Wouldn’t a generous application of
the right to religious and moral freedom involve resolving the benefit of the
doubt in favor of the conclusion that the choice at issue is animated by ‘core or
meaning-giving beliefs and commitments’—and is therefore protected by that
right?”45
Third, Perry’s account not only gives human rights morality a justificatory
role to play in the process of constitutional interpretation but also provides a
purposeful, almost teleological role regarding the identification and articulation
of substantive constitutional rights. To see how this might work, we can ask
ourselves as citizens the following question: how should we decide what rights
we should allow to become part of the fabric of our life, and therefore part of the
bedrock of the Constitution for American life in the future?
For Perry, the Exception to his General Rule of constitutional interpretation
points the way toward the answer to this question: a claim of human rights that
reasonably could be viewed as a constitutional right ought to be treated as a
constitutional human right, even if there is a reasonable argument to the
contrary.46 Once it has been treated as such a right by the courts and accepted as
such a right by the people, then it fully becomes such a right because it has now
been hardened into constitutional bedrock.47 We, as a people living in a
constitutional democracy, ought to strive to incorporate global human rights into
our lives, our law, and ultimately, our constitutional interpretation.48

42

Id. at 63–87.
See id. at 83 n.57 (detailing the content of the religion clauses); cf. id. at 64–65 (explaining portions of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights relating to religious freedom that are similar to those in the U.S.
Constitution).
44
Id. at 68 (“‘It is the religious or spiritual essence of an action,’ reasoned the Canadian Supreme Court,
‘not any mandatory or perceived-as-mandatory nature of its observance, that attracts protection.’” (citing
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 588 (Can.)).
45
Id. at 69.
46
See supra note 29.
47
See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 21, at 60 n.39 (2017) (discussing how a human right became a “bedrock
feature of the constitutional law of the United States”).
48
See infra Part III.
43
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As my last point suggests, Perry’s commitment to global human rights not
only infuses his approach to constitutional interpretation but also animates his
political morality. But this explanation does not do justice to Perry’s
commitments. He writes that “the morality of human rights is not just a political
morality, it is a political morality—indeed, the first truly global political
morality in human history.”49 Perry recognizes that some, even many, human
rights are legal rights in that they are recognized and enforceable by the
machinery of a legal system.50 Nonetheless, he argues that the fundamental
nature of human rights is moral rather than legal:
Some human rights—the human rights the violation of which truly
does violate the “act toward all human beings in a spirit of
brotherhood” imperative or an equivalent norm—are moral rights. If
we call such human rights “true” human rights, we may say that all
true human rights are moral rights.51

Like Aristotle, Perry believes human beings are zoa politika—political
animals.52 Not only do we need to advocate on behalf of the well-being of other
human beings but we also need to work with them to forge a flourishing common
life together in our polis. In fact, in Love and Power, Perry describes himself as
advocating a “neo-Aristotelian liberalism”53 for our liberal polity, which
requires articulating and defending an “‘ecumenical’ politics.”54 Perry’s
approach to political dialogue in the public square is reflected in his
understanding of political morality. In fact, one can easily reframe his
contribution to the debate about the role of religion, and other comprehensive
worldviews, in public discussion in terms of his injunction to “act toward all
human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.”55
49
50
51
52

Id. at 7.
Id. at 19–23.
Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. I, at 1253a1 (W. D. Ross trans., 1998) (“[M]an is by nature a political animal

. . . .”).
53
“The liberalism of ecumenical politics is a neo-Aristotelian liberalism.” MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND
POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 138 (1991).
54
Id. at 44–45 (“‘[E]cumenical’ politics aspires to discern or achieve, in a religiously and morally
pluralistic context, a common political ground. Moreover, as I later explain, ecumenical politics, like ecumenical
theology, is pluralist: It values moral (including religious-moral) pluralism.”).
55
Perry asks this question:

What reason (or reasons) do we have—if indeed we have any—to take human rights seriously;
more precisely, what reason do we have, if any, to live our lives in accord with the imperative,
which is articulated in the very first article of the foundational human rights document of our
time, the UDHR, and which is the very heart of the morality of human rights: “Act towards all
human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.”
PERRY, supra note 21, at 8.
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Not surprisingly, then, Perry advocates for the adoption of an Aristotelian
mean with regard to neuralgic questions on the role of religion in the public
square:
The serious challenge, in my view, is to define a middle ground
between, on the one side the position of [those] . . . who would largely
exclude religious-moral discourse from political-justificatory practice
and, on the other side, the position of those would bring religiousmoral discourse to bear in a sectarian, divisive way.56

More specifically, Perry rejects the call for a “Holy Grail of neutral/impartial
political justification” for two major reasons.57 First, he contends that “a practice
of political justification that tolerates only neutral/impartial arguments is not
itself neutral/impartial.”58 Second, he maintains that “only a politics in which
beliefs about human good, including disputed beliefs, have a central place is
capable of addressing our most basic political questions.”59 How, then, do we
discuss these matters in ways that are not counterproductive and excessively
divisive? Perry responds to this challenge with a call to “ecumenical political
dialogue,” a practice that he describes, in a way fitting for an Aristotelian, largely
in terms of the virtues that foster its success. Important personal qualities include
cognitive competency (e.g., being well-informed),60 respect for one’s
interlocutors,61 honesty,62 and sincerity.63 The list of necessary qualities, in
Perry’s view, also includes a commitment to fallibilism (e.g., embracing a selfcritical understanding rationality) and pluralism (i.e., the belief that there is
something to learn from other ways of life).64
Perry’s “cardinal dialogic virtues” are two: “public intelligibility and public
accessibility.”65 These virtues enable Perry to treat religious and secular
worldviews in the same way and on the same terms. Both fully belong in the

56
57
58
59

PERRY, supra note 53, at 5.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 29. For Perry, considering beliefs about human good is overdue:
If Ackerman, Nagel, or others want to persist in the quest for a neutral/impartial politics, so be it.
Understandably, others of us believe that the quest for the Holy Grail of neutral/impartial political
justification is spent and that it is past time to take a different, more promising path.

Id. at 28.
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 99–100.
Id.
Id. at 100–05.
Id. at 105–12.
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public square as long as they conform to his dialogic virtues, which “inhibit
sectarian imperialism . . . the very antithesis of ecumenical dialogue.”66 Public
intelligibility is “the habit of trying to elaborate one’s position in a manner
intelligible or comprehensible to those who speak a different religious or moral
language.”67 Public accessibility is “the habit of trying to defend one’s position
in a manner neither sectarian nor authoritarian.”68 Perry’s critique of
sectarianism is not targeted solely at religious believers. In fact, it calls for the
repudiation of any “rel[iance] on experiences or premises that have little if any
authority beyond the confines of one’s own moral or religious community.”69
Analogously, he rejects “authoritarian” defenses because they “rel[y] on persons
or institutions that have little if any authority beyond the confines of one’s own
community.”70
The foregoing pages have, I hope, been sufficient to give some sense of the
lines of connection across the three major areas of Michael Perry’s scholarship.
His approach to both the form and the substance of political morality is not only
integrative but also inclusive. In his discussion on public morality, he grants the
possibility of contributing to the discussion about the public good to the widest
range of sources, both religious and secular.71 In treating the development of
global human rights morality, Perry does not present that development as a
purely secular accomplishment of lawyers and political philosophers but rather
highlights the contributions of religious thinkers and religious thought to the
project.72 Moreover, in working out his constitutional theory, Perry carefully
sifts through religious contributions to public debate. He is neither a culture
warrior nor an all-or-nothing thinker. For example, he maintains the broader
legitimacy of conservative Christian political efforts to protect unborn human
beings while arguing that their efforts to deny marriage to same-sex couples is
unacceptably sectarian. One may agree or disagree with him on either issue. At
the same time, however, it is impossible not to acknowledge that Perry
exemplifies the ecumenical political virtues he advocates.

66

Id. at 108.
Id. at 106.
68
Id.
69
Id. (emphasis added).
70
Id. (emphasis added).
71
Emphasizing the consonances between common morality and the morality of religious traditions, Perry
reflects that “the great religious traditions, Indic as well as semitic, tend to converge with one another in affirming
that an essential part of what it means to be (truly, fully) human, an essential requirement of the meaningful life
for everyone, is to accept (some) responsibility for the basic well-being of the Other.” Id. at 90.
72
PERRY, supra note 21, at 29–41.
67
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The integration—and the inclusiveness—achieved by Perry’s work is not
accidental. It depends on key anthropological, social, and epistemological
assumptions that undergird his vision and support his project. His core
commitment is anthropological: he believes in the equal moral dignity of every
human being. His belief in this regard tracks most Christian concepts of the
human being as made in the image and likeness of God. In fact, many classical
theologians specified the imago dei as the specifically human capacity to reason,
deliberate, and choose.73 At the same time, deliberation and choice are never
isolated events. Human beings are essentially social. We live together and learn
together in overlapping communities extending over time. We are members of
families and towns, regions, and nations, as well as churches, synagogues, and
mosques. Consequently, while Perry wants to give great weight to the individual
and social conscience,74 he does not confer upon their deliverances an exemption
from discussion and debate. Individually and collectively, our consciences can
be mistaken.
Perry also thinks that human beings and human communities have much in
common. He recognizes that “there is . . . a good common to every human being,
a human and not merely local good.”75 Perry readily acknowledges that this good
may need to be defined in pluralistic terms and expressed in ways sensitive to
the differences of time, place, and culture. Nonetheless, he contends that it
exists. Consequently, he believes that it is both necessary and possible for human
beings to work together despite their differences, aiming to coordinate their wellbeing and their visions of the good. Indeed, because a key aspect of human
flourishing is expressing concern for the other, Perry thinks that such
coordination is a moral imperative.76
Perry’s pluralism, in short, is both bounded (in that it is limited by the needs
and aspirations of our common human nature) and optimistic (in that it views
discussion and debate as potentially productive and unifying). He believes that

73
For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see generally ANTHONY A. HOEKEMA, CREATED IN GOD’S
IMAGE (1986).
74
PERRY, supra note 21, at 65–67.
75
PERRY, supra note 53, at 32.
76
He writes, for example, the following:

A theist—in particular, an adherent of one of the three Abrahamic religions—may say something
to this effect: The perfection for which God created us, the true happiness (eudaimonia) that is
our fundamental end, consists in part, in discerning—in our hearts, so to speak, if not also in our
minds—the Other (i.e., every “other,” every human being) as sacred—as a beloved child of God
and as a sister or brother to oneself—and in loving the Other.
PERRY, supra note 21, at 32.
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it is good that we are all here, working together, despite our differences. Of the
United States in particular, he writes that “in our religiously and morally
pluralistic domestic context, there is good reason to believe that significant
premises about human good, significant standards of political-moral judgment,
are authoritative for many (though not for all) persons and groups in American
society.”77
II. CULTURE WARS AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Perry’s vision of the possibilities of cooperation across differences is
appealing. I believe it to be true. But in the United States, we now find ourselves
in a situation in which many Americans no longer believe it to be true. The
culture wars in the United States have been simmering for decades now. Perhaps
they have always been with us.78 In my view, however, their most recent
configuration congealed in the early- to mid-1990s around issues of sex, gender,
and family.
In 1995, Pope John Paul II issued an encyclical titled Evangelium Vitae (the
“Gospel of Life”), which framed the dominant cultural struggle in the West as
one between a “culture of life” and a “culture of death.”79 In his view, the
“culture of life” protects the elderly, the unborn, and all vulnerable human beings
against intentional killing or other forms of violence.80 Moreover, it values
traditional heterosexual family structure as the best place to protect vulnerable
life, rejecting contraception and premarital sex.81 The “culture of death,” in
contrast, privileges individual fulfillment and financial success, valuing
autonomy over human connection and interdependence. It features legalized
abortion and euthanasia, recognizes extramarital sex (both heterosexual and
homosexual), and champions contraception as a responsible choice.82
The Pope’s theme of “culture wars” fell on receptive ground in the United
States. Just a few years earlier, University of Virginia professor James Davison
Hunter had published a book called Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define
America,83 which analyzed political and social divisions among Americans. He
traced the divisions between religious, socially conservative citizens and their
77

Id. at 41.
For a history, see ANDREW HARTMAN, A WAR FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA: A HISTORY
CULTURE WARS (2d ed. 2019).
79
JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE 37, ¶ 21 (1995).
80
Id. ¶ 87.
81
Id. ¶ 90 (“A family policy must be the basis and driving force of all social policies.”).
82
Id.
83
JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
78

OF THE
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secular, more socially liberal counterparts on a range of issues from sex to public
education to gun rights, arguing presciently that these divisions not only reflect
different policy choices but also instantiate very different world views.84 On the
one hand, liberal secularists deride religious conservatives as ignorant and
intolerant, powerless to resist the inexorable march of social progress.85 On the
other hand, religious conservatives question the very definition of progress.86
Believing themselves to be under siege since the 1960s, conservative Catholics,
Evangelical Protestants, and Jews set aside their theological differences to
organize politically and push back against what they viewed as an aggressive,
encroaching secularist mindset.87
The three main foci of Perry’s intellectual interests have substantially
affected and themselves been affected by the culture wars. In my view, for
example, the intensive and extensive discussion about Rawls’s concept of public
reason served only to deepen the suspicion with which religiously affiliated
social conservatives viewed secular elites.88 They deeply resented the
implication that their presence—and their beliefs—in the American public
square needed to be cabined and controlled, while secularists were free to speak
their minds without restraint.89 Moreover, the appeal of progressives to the
language of human rights did not apply a balm to conservative worries. In fact,
many religious conservatives were strongly influenced by Alasdair MacIntyre’s
scathing account of rights, as in After Virtue.90 MacIntyre argues that rights are
arbitrarily defined fictions that prop up liberal society, which he views as
excessively individualistic, emotivistic, and manipulative.91 While not willing
to dismiss all rights—particularly the right to religious freedom—many religious
and social conservatives found in MacIntyre’s work a framework that helped
them deflect liberal claims to rights regarding sexual freedom and abortion.92
84
85
86
87

Id. at 31–34.
Id. at 140–41.
Id. at 137.
See 1 CULTURE WARS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISSUES, VIEWPOINTS, AND VOICES (Roger Chapman ed.,

2010).
88
See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (2002). A helpful, scholarly exploration of the difficulties
from the perspective of religious believers can be found in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM (Paul J.
Weithman ed., 1997). On the idea of backlash by conservative Christians, see Phil Ryan, Stout, Rawls, and the
Idea of Public Reason, 42 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 450 (2014).
89
See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
90
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (3d ed. 2007).
91
Id. at 70.
92
MacIntyre’s argument has been popularized—and in my view, distorted—by those who think he
literally advocates the creation of hermetically sealed Christian communities. See, e.g., ROD DREHER, THE
BENEDICT OPTION: A STRATEGY FOR CHRISTIANS IN A POST-CHRISTIAN NATION (2018).
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But it is the third prong of Perry’s interests—constitutional interpretation—
that intersects most closely with the culture wars. As James Davidson Hunter
pointed out long ago, a key aspect of the battle was the struggle to control the
law, particularly the courts that interpret the law.93 In this struggle, religious
conservatives have arguably emerged as the victors. They successfully
advocated a textualist and originalist approach to constitutional interpretation—
an approach that strongly limited the judicial development of constitutional
rights over time.94 Moreover, they successfully portrayed those that adopted a
more developmental approach to constitutional interpretation—in a manner
consonant with the broader common law tradition—as “making the law” by
usurping the power of the legislative branch.95 During the four years in which
Donald J. Trump was president, the decades of efforts on the part of the
Federalist Society to assume control of the federal courts came to fruition.96
Trump appointed Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett to
the Supreme Court, thereby ensuring that the Court will be dominated for the
foreseeable future by a 6-3 conservative majority.97
The divisions on the Court are glaring. At an event sponsored by the
American Bar Association, liberal Justice Sonia Sotomayor said that “[t]here is
going to be a lot of disappointment in the law, a huge amount.”98 A few weeks
earlier, in a speech delivered at the McConnell Center at the University of
Louisville, conservative Justice Amy Coney Barrett, denied that the justices
were “a bunch of partisan hacks.”99 Senator Mitch McConnell, who spearheaded
her confirmation just weeks before the presidential election that brought defeat
to her presidential nominator, emphasized her bona fides from the perspective
of social conservatives: “[She] does not try to ‘legislate from the bench.’ He also

93

HUNTER, supra note 83, at 250–87.
For an introduction, see JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2007).
95
Robert George, Judicial Usurpation and the Constitution: Historical and Contemporary Issues, THE
HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 11, 2005), https://www.heritage.org/report/judicial-usurpation-and-the-constitutionhistorical-and-contemporary-issues.
96
Jason Zengerie, How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remaking-courts-judiciary.html.
97
See David Montgomery, Conquerors of the Courts: Forget Trump’s Supreme Court Picks. The
Federalist Society’s Impact on the Law Goes Much Deeper., WASH. POST MAG. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/02/feature/conquerors-of-the-courts/.
98
Ariane de Vogue, Justice Sonia Sotomayor: ‘There Is Going to Be a Lot of Disappointment in the Law,
a Huge Amount,’ CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/29/politics/sonia-sotomayor/index.html (Oct. 7, 2021,
8:58 PM).
99
Chandelis Duster, Justice Amy Coney Barrett Says Supreme Court Is ‘Not a Bunch of Partisan Hacks’,
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/13/politics/amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-not-partisan/index.html (Sept. 13,
2021, 9:45 AM).
94
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noted she is from ‘Middle America’ and the only current justice to not have
attended Harvard or Yale.”100
Notwithstanding Justice Barrett’s protestations, Americans likely believe
that the culture wars have infested the Supreme Court. A recent Gallup Poll,
released just days after Justice Barrett’s speech at the McConnell Center,
revealed that only forty percent of Americans approved of the job being done by
the justices.101 The poll revealed a strong correlation between those who
disapprove of the Court’s ideology (as too liberal or too conservative) and those
who think it is doing a bad job.102
Moreover, there is reason to think the Supreme Court has indeed been
infested by the culture wars, at least regarding their jurisprudence on the issues
most important to many warriors on both sides. At present, in my view, there are
two fundamentally different approaches to the identification of fundamental
rights uneasily at play in the Court’s active jurisprudence. It is difficult not only
to reconcile the approaches but also to get their proponents to engage with one
another in a constructive, non-polemical way. The two conflicting approaches
are exemplified by the sharply contrasting jurisprudential frameworks in
Glucksberg, which declined to recognize physician assisted suicide as a
constitutional right, and Obergefell, which conferred constitutional protection
on same-sex marriage.103 The Glucksberg majority adopts a historically oriented
approach to the identification of due process rights, protecting claims that are
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”104 According to the
majority opinion, “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices thus
provide the crucial ‘guideposts for responsible decision-making,’ that direct and
restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.”105 In contrast, the Obergefell
majority’s approach is less concerned with history and more focused on the
contemporary enculturation of enduring political values: “The fundamental
liberties protected by this [Due Process] Clause include most of the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. In addition, these liberties extend to certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate

100

Id.
Jeffrey M. Jones, Approval of U.S. Supreme Court Down to 40%, a New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 23, 2021),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/354908/approval-supreme-court-down-new-low.aspx.
102
Id.
103
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735–36 (1997); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681
(2015).
104
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion)).
105
Id. at 721 (citations omitted).
101

KAVENY_6.22.22

1568

6/23/2022 2:28 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1549

choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”106 The central question for the
Obergefell majority is what sort of claims must be protected to defend these
fundamental values in a changing society.107
At first glance, Glucksberg and Obergefell seem to occupy mutually
exclusive jurisprudential universes. But, they are connected by a case that looms
behind them and even before them, a case that galvanizes both approaches, for
good or ill: Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey.108 For the
Obergefell majority, Casey is a lodestar, offering a pellucid and compact
articulation of the purposes and scope of the Due Process Clause. For the
Glucksberg majority, in contrast, Casey is a death star, a disastrous and
destructive misadventure in constitutional interpretation. Casey, in my view, is
the epicenter of the current configuration of the culture wars in the constitutional
realm.
The result in Casey itself was not radical. In a 5-4 decision, Casey
maintained constitutional protection for a right to abortion while crafting a new
standard that permits more regulation of the practice than was permissible under
Roe v. Wade.109 Under the Casey test, it is constitutionally impermissible for a
state regulation to impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to seek an
abortion before viability.110 An unduly burdensome law is one that, “by purpose

106

Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 663.
Id. at 659 (“The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in isolation from
developments in law and society. The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. That institution—
even as confined to opposite-sex relations—has evolved over time.”).
108
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
109
From a policy perspective, Casey recast Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in three basic ways. First,
it explicitly recognized the State’s interest in nascent life:
107

The woman’s liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the State cannot show its
concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State’s interest in
life has sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. Second, Casey “reject[ed] the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part
of the essential holding of Roe.” Id. at 873. Third, Casey did not adopt a hermeneutic of suspicion toward nearly
all regulation of abortion, a suspicion which reached its high-water mark in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), and began to recede in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
110
While undue burdens are not permitted, the Court recognized that the State may impose some burdens:
The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion
that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right to decide
whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue. In our view, the undue burden standard is the
appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected
liberty.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
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or effect,” puts a “substantial obstacle” in the way “of a woman seeking an
abortion.”111
Casey exemplifies the culture war in three ways. First, the Court itself was
bitterly divided about both outcome and rationale.112 Second, many social
conservatives, like the conservative justices on the Court, viewed the case as a
vehicle for overturning Roe.113 Third, social conservatives felt deceived and
betrayed by the three Republican appointees to the Court who crafted the
majority opinion that saved the constitutional right to abortion: Sandra Day
O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy (both appointed by Ronald Reagan), as well
as David Souter (appointed by George H.W. Bush).114 In short, for social
conservatives, it was not enough that the new constitutional test signaled a
significant reduction in the Court’s hostility to the regulation of abortion and
growing acknowledgement of the value of unborn life. In their view, Roe
required not merely reformation but rather thoroughgoing repudiation. Casey
was objectionable because it further entrenched the constitutional right to
abortion.115

111

Id. at 877.
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter articulate the revised test in Part IV of the opinion. Id. at 869–
79. Both Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun would have applied a test more protective of a right to abortion.
Id. at 911–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 922–43 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice White, and Justice Thomas, would have more greatly restricted that right. Id. at 979–1002, (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Consequently, the net effect is that the test articulated
in Part IV controls.
113
See, e.g., Ed Kilgore, For the Anti-Abortion Movement, It’s Been a Long Road Back from the Great
Betrayal of 1992, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 1, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/12/anti-abortion-movementnears-victory-29-years-after-betrayal.html.
114
See, e.g., Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Federalist Court: How the Federalist Society Became the
De Facto Selector of Republican Supreme Court Justices, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2017), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2017/01/how-the-federalist-society-became-the-de-facto-selector-of-republican-supreme-courtjustices.html.
115
See, for example, the blistering editorial in the neo-conservative magazine First Things:
112

Media chatter notwithstanding, Casey is neither an accommodation of conflicting views in the
abortion debate nor a movement of even one inch toward an accommodation. The Court majority
is absolutely right when it says that it absolutely affirms “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade.”
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter are not the “moderates” finding a middle way between extremes.
On the substantive question, their way is the way of Blackmun and Stevens. In an apocalyptic
concurring opinion that depicts “two worlds” at war—the children of darkness vs. the children of
light—Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe, celebrates Casey by declaring that once again “the
flame has grown bright.”
Editorial, Abortion and a Nation at War, FIRST THINGS (Oct. 1992), https://www.firstthings.com/article/1992/
10/editorial-abortion-and-a-nation-at-war.
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From the perspective of religious and social conservatives, however, Casey
manifested a far more general—and lethal—jurisprudential error. It inscribed
into constitutional jurisprudence a paean to autonomy that seems to adopt an
individualist and constructivist account of moral values—an account in which
each person creates norms by choosing them, as opposed to recognizing and
responding to moral norms that exist independently of individual human choice.
The offending passage, often called the “Mystery Passage,” is widely attributed
to Justice Kennedy:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.116

These words celebrate a notion of individual self-creation, including moralcreation, which has been applauded by progressive jurists as a basis for the
identification and protection of new personal rights. Not surprisingly, it is also
loathed by religious and social conservatives.117 In their view, human beings are
required to identify and observe moral norms that make a claim on them
regardless of personal choices—for some, those norms are enunciated in an
authoritative religious text; for others, they are discernable from the nature and
structure of human reality.118 While there are a wide variety of accounts of
“biblical ethics” and “natural law morality,” these accounts are united in their
repudiation of the idea that morality is confected by the choice of each
individual.119
In the past twenty-five years, the Mystery Passage has proven itself to be a
litmus test—or lighting rod—for the justices serving on a deeply divided
Supreme Court. More troublingly, it has also precipitated two opposing views
of Fourteenth Amendment interpretation that proceed more in wary isolation
than in dialogue with each other, at least in key majority opinions. At the present
moment, these two opposed views of the jurisprudence of Fourteenth
116

Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
See, e.g., William Haun, The “Mystery of Life” Makes Law a Mystery, PUB. DISCOURSE (July 26, 2013),
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/07/10091/.
118
See generally Michael Quinlan, The Sources of Morality (Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2970899) (conducting a survey of various sources of human morality).
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See, e.g., Carl E. Braaten, Reclaiming the Natural Law for Theological Ethics, J. LUTHERAN ETHICS
(Oct. 1, 2007), https://www.elca.org/JLE/Articles/484.
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Amendment rights are inscribed in constitutional law, where they remain at an
uneasy standoff.
First, consider Glucksberg, a case in which the Supreme Court declined to
recognize a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. While citing Casey
on ancillary points, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion of the Court does not
engage, much less criticize, the Mystery Passage. Instead, it proceeds to
construct an alternative, skeptical stance toward the recognition of new
constitutional rights.120
The Glucksberg majority sets a two-pronged test for a purported right to
qualify for constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause.121 First,
courts should look to see if the purported right or liberty interest is “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”122 Second, courts should require a
“careful description” of the right or liberty interest.123 Needless to say, the
second element takes logical precedence over the first. Rejecting the Ninth
Circuit’s autonomy-focused description as to whether there exists “a liberty
interest in determining the time and manner of one’s death,” the Glucksberg
majority instead draws its description from the laws that must be struck down to
protect the right.124 Consequently, what is at issue is “a right to commit suicide
which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”125 Once the majority
settles on this description of the right, the first component of the analysis
becomes evident. Most importantly, since suicide was long prohibited by state
law, no right to commit suicide, either with or without assistance, can be deeply
rooted in our nation’s history and tradition.126
The Glucksberg Court neither ignores Casey nor demeans it. But it deftly
resizes and reframes it. More specifically, after quoting the Mystery Passage, the
Court proceeds in two steps to deny it any expansive implications. First, it

120

The Court notes the difficulty in recognizing new rights:
But we “ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decision-making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.”
By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent,
place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992)).
121
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21.
122
Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
123
Id.
124
Id. at 722–23.
125
Id. at 723.
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Id. at 719.
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interprets the Mystery Passage as describing “in a general way and in light of
our prior cases” the Fourteenth Amendment rights that have been identified
according to the two-step process for identifying constitutional rights set forth
in Glucksberg.127 The Court sidesteps controversy, giving no hint that some
rights (e.g., the right to abortion) might be justified by the Mystery Passage but
not by the Glucksberg test. Second, the Court tacitly treats the Mystery Passage
as a rhetorical trope rather than as a serious constitutional test: “That many of
the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal
autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important,
intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”128
Needless to say, the preceding sentence from Glucksberg was not quoted by
the majority in Obergefell, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
a fundamental right to marry that extends to same-sex couples.129 Authored by
Justice Kennedy, the majority opinion in Obergefell reads like a master class in
the jurisprudential implications of the Mystery Passage. Its first two sentences
signal the path of reasoning taken by the opinion:
The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful
realm, to define and express their identity. The petitioners in these
cases seek to find that liberty by marrying someone of the same sex
and having their marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and
conditions as marriages between persons of the opposite sex.130

Echoing and amplifying the themes of the Mystery Passage, Kennedy’s opinion
emphasizes the importance of marriage to individual dignity, self-creation, and
intimacy:
Choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny. As the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has explained, because “it fulfils
127

Id. at 727.
Id.
129
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015). Kennedy grounds the recognition of the constitutional
right to marry in four principles, which he argues are as crucial to same-sex couples as to opposite sex couples:
(1) “[T]he right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy.”
(2) “[T]he right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals.”
(3) “[T]he right to marry . . . safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related
rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”
(4) “[T]his Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the
Nation’s social order.”
Id.; see id. at 665–69.
130
Id. at 651–52.
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yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our
common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the
decision whether and whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts
of self-definition.131

While Kennedy certainly recognizes the social dimensions of marriage, he
focuses on the institution as a protected form of personal intimacy: “Marriage
responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no
one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance
that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other.”132 Since
same-sex couples need and receive the same benefits from the institution of
marriage, the Court concludes that it is a violation of the principle of equal
protection to deny them these benefits.133
The majority opinion in Obergefell deals with Glucksberg in a way
analogous to the Glucksberg approach to Casey. First, it articulates a historically
and morally developmental approach to the identification of Fourteenth
Amendment rights that implicitly repudiates Glucksberg’s approach, just as
Glucksberg implicitly repudiated Casey’s. Regarding the task of articulating
fundamental rights, Kennedy writes the following:
[The Court] is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to
analysis of other constitutional provisions that set forth broad
principles rather than specific requirements. History and tradition
guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.
That method respects our history and learns from it without allowing
the past alone to rule the present.134

Second, the Obergefell majority opinion treats the Glucksberg test itself both
gingerly and dismissively. Kennedy briefly acknowledges the objection that,
according to Glucksberg’s requirements, a “careful description” of the right at
issue is not “the right to marry but rather a new and nonexistent ‘right to samesex marriage.’”135 Rather than addressing the conflict head-on, he treats the case
as distinct legal entities. Kennedy writes the following:
Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must
be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to
specific historical practices. Yet while that approach may have been
appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted
131
132
133
134
135

Id. at 666 (quoting Goodridge v. Dept. Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003)).
Id. at 667.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 664 (citation omitted).
Id. at 671 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 8 (No. 14-556)).
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suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in
discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and
intimacy.136

Glucksberg gently distinguished and thereby deftly sidelined Casey. In due time,
Obergefell did much the same to Glucksberg. But in fact, these cases are not
readily distinguishable on the basis of their treatment in American legal history.
Abortion, assisted suicide, and sexual activity between members of the same sex
were all criminalized activities for long periods in American life. More recently,
each practice has been vigorously defended as a fundamental aspect of an
individual’s rightful autonomy over the course of his or her own life.137
Consequently, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the two cases
instantiate two diametrically opposed stances toward the identification of
fundamental rights. Mutual, gentle treatment of one another in the two very
different majority opinions cannot disguise this fact—or the fact that their
respective approaches correspond to the entrenched opposing factions of the
culture wars.
It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that many Americans do not
rigidly define themselves morally or politically in the terms set by warring
groups of social activists. Consider, for example, differences between recent
polls on same-sex marriage and abortion. While culture warriors tend either to
oppose (or to support) both abortion and same-sex marriage, many Americans
distinguish between the two issues. According to a 2021 Gallup poll, seventy
percent of Americans support same-sex marriage—a record high.138 Climbing
from twenty-seven percent in 1997, the approval level reached sixty percent in
2015, the year Obergefell was handed down. For the first time, in 2021, a small
majority of Republicans (fifty-five percent) supported same-sex marriage.139
In contrast, polls suggest that the shape of the abortion debate has moved
very little over the past fifty years. According to Gallup, for example, in 2021,
thirty-two percent of the population said that “abortion should be legal under
any circumstances,” thirteen percent said that it “should be legal in most
circumstances,” thirty-three percent said that it should be legal “only in a few
circumstances,” and nineteen percent said that it should be “illegal in all
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Id.
John McChesney & Deborah Tedford, States Weigh Gay Marriage, Other Sensitive Issues, NPR (Nov.
5, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96600599.
138
Justin McCarthy, Record-High 70% in U.S. Support Same-Sex Marriage, GALLUP (June 8, 2021),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/350486/record-high-support-same-sex-marriage.aspx.
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circumstances.”140 Three percent of the respondents expressed no position.141 In
1994, the first year for which Gallup provides data on this question, the
responses were virtually identical.142 Thirty-three percent said that abortion
should be legal in any circumstances, thirteen percent said that it should be legal
in most circumstances, thirty-eight percent said that it should be legal only in a
few circumstances, and thirteen percent said that it should be illegal in all
circumstances. Three percent expressed no position.143
One might respond, “So what?” The key obligation of the Supreme Court is
to articulate timeless constitutional principles—consequences be damned. On
this view, one might insist that the constitutional rights to abortion and same-sex
marriage stand or fall together. Either one goes with Glucksberg or the Mystery
Passage—there is no middle ground. But I believe this is a false dichotomy for
many of the reasons expressed by Alexander Bickel in his classic work, The
Least Dangerous Branch.144 Bickel recognized that the Supreme Court was
tasked with articulating constitutional principles.145 At the same time, he clearly
saw that task as inevitably entangled with and responsive to the political
community it serves.146
First, according to Bickel, in the common law system, principle is neither
ahistorical nor insensitive to the prevailing moral and political commitments:
I have suggested that the rule of principle in our society is neither
precipitate nor uncompromising, that principle may be a universal
guide but not a universal constraint, that leeway is provided to
expediency along the path to, and alongside the path of principle, and,
finally, that principle is evolved conversationally not perfected
unilaterally.147

Second, while the Court may be charged with leading the articulation of our
nation’s fundamental moral commitments, it is not meant to substitute its own
commitments for those of the people:
What is meant, rather, is that the Court should declare as law only such
principles as will—in time, but in a rather immediate future—gain
140

Abortion, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last visited May 10, 2022).
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
(2d ed. 1986).
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Id. at 203.
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Id. at 220.
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Id. at 244.
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general assent. . . . The Court is a leader of opinion, not merely a
register of it, but it must lead opinion, not merely impose its own;
and—the short of it is—it labors under the obligation to succeed.148

Those who adopt the Glucksberg approach to the identification of constitutional
rights may object that they do not violate Bickel’s injunction because they are
so parsimonious in identifying new constitutional rights. This objection misses
Bickel’s point. The values of the American people evolve over time—including
their conception of what counts as a fundamental right. For the Court to so
tightly tether the nation’s fundamental constitutional commitments to the view
of the framers about particular meanings is to ignore the fact that the framers
themselves understood that they were drafting a charter that needed to be flexible
enough to meet circumstances they could not foresee.149 The men who justified
revolution from English rule cannot sensibly be interpreted as attempting to
preserve their own legal and moral commitments in constitutional amber for all
time—nor even as requiring every development to be encapsulated in a
constitutional amendment. After all, they are sons of the common law tradition,
retained by the American colonies even as they threw off British rule.150
III. A WAY FORWARD: MICHAEL PERRY ON THE BENCH
As Bickel’s work suggests, the Court can betray the people by stymying the
development of constitutional principles as well as by forcing such development
too quickly. Bickel also suggests that the Court can betray the people by clinging
to a particular framework for too long, articulating broad constitutional
principles like due process or equal protection: “Everybody knows that the
lifetime of applied principle is often no longer than one or two generations.”151
In my view, both Casey’s amorphous Mystery Passage and the rigid two-step
framework found in Glucksberg may be reaching the end of their usefulness as
an applied (or applicable) expression of constitutional principle because neither
is able to encompass the complexities of American views on fundamental
questions like same-sex marriage and abortion.152
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Id. at 239.
See, e.g., Michael Kammen, “A Vehicle of Life”: The Founders’ Intentions and American Perceptions
of Their Living Constitution, 131 AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 325, 329–31 (1987).
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For a nuanced history, see generally Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in
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(2019).
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But what is the way forward? In this Part, I suggest that Michael Perry’s
integrative approach might offer us some insights. It is not a blueprint, of course.
But it is a very helpful inspiration. In Chapter Six of A Global Political Morality,
Perry illustrates his constitutional theory by offering five hypothetical judicial
opinions on some of the most controversial cases to come before the U.S.
Supreme Court: “[C]apital punishment, raced-based affirmative action, samesex marriage, physician-assisted suicide, and abortion.”153
One might say Perry’s approach is equally opposed (from a jurisprudential
perspective) to the Mystery Passage and the Glucksberg test. That claim may
seem counterintuitive. But as I indicated earlier, neither of these two approaches
to law incorporate substantive moral and political commitments into the heart of
their frameworks. On the one hand, taken by itself, the Mystery Passage outlines
a purely individualist and constructivist account of morality—it implies that
each individual defines the “meaning of the universe” for purposes of living her
own life. On the other hand, taken by itself, the Glucksberg test is purely
positivistic. What ultimately matters is that the right is “deeply rooted” in our
history and tradition—not that it withstands critical moral scrutiny here and now.
I am not saying, of course, that Kennedy and Rehnquist do not incorporate
normative values into their respective analyses of abortion and same-sex
marriage or physician-assisted suicide. They most certainly do. What I am
saying, however, is that their respective ways of framing the issue do not put the
question of normative political values at the center of the discussion of
Fourteenth Amendment rights. They advance their respective moral and political
views tacitly rather than explicitly. The Rehnquist approach says, “It’s nothing
personal. We are not deliberately favoring political and moral conservative
values—it just so happens that the values deeply rooted in our nation’s past (as
we read them) are conservative.” The Kennedy approach says, “It’s not personal
on our part either—it just so happens that the values chosen by individuals
gripped with the task of self-creation (as we see them) tend to be creative and
innovative.” But such responses are likely to be cold comfort to their critics.
Consequently, they can leave those who do not share those views feeling
ignored, manipulated, and even disrespected.
For Perry, in contrast, the normative commitments of the human rights
framework, as inspired by and specified in the American constitutional tradition,
are front and center. Perry’s central commitment, as I explained above,
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highlights the dignity and inviolability of all human beings.154 He
straightforwardly works out the jurisprudential implications of that commitment
in each of his hypothetical opinions. He makes judgments about those
implications, directly engaging with (rather than sidestepping) arguments
opposed to his own. Moreover, he interprets opposing views in a broad spirit of
intellectual charity. By so doing, he indicates that the holders of these views still
count as fellow citizens, even if they did not win in this particular case. This is
the polar opposite of a culture war approach.
Consider Perry’s treatment of same-sex marriage. While he ultimately
confers constitutional protection on the practice, he does not do so in way that
ignores the moral, social, and political concerns of those on the other side of the
issue.155 For example, while he begins with an equal protection argument, he
does not end with it—in part because his view of equal protection is morally
nuanced. Perry understands the right to equal protection as the following:
[A]t its core, the right not to be treated by government less well than
another is treated, or otherwise disadvantaged, based on the demeaning
view that one is morally inferior, in this sense: not worthy, or less
worthy than some others, of being treated—in the words of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights—“in a spirit of
brotherhood.”156

Thus, the core of equal protection is not differential treatment but rather
differential treatment based on a demeaning view. While Perry does not
downplay the shameful treatment of the LGBTQ+ community over the years, he
takes pains to acknowledge that not all opposition to same-sex marriage is rooted
in a demeaning view—even when the opposition extends to sexual activity
between same-sex couples.157 Taking official Catholic teaching seriously, he
notes that the Catholic Church affirms the equal dignity of all persons regarding
sexual orientation but insists that permissible sexual activity only takes place in
a lifelong, heterosexual marriage (a demanding teaching for heterosexual people
as well).158 Consequently, Perry does not ground protection for same-sex
marriage in the Equal Protection Clause, since “adjudging same-sex sexual
conduct to be immoral does not assert, imply, or presuppose that those who
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engage in the conduct are morally inferior human beings.”159 By this step, he
affirms his continuing right to participate in the conversation of religious
conservatives. They are not to be dismissed as bigots because of their moral
judgments about sexual relationships outside of traditional marriage.
Next, Perry turns from equal protection to the right to privacy as a potential
basis for a constitutional status of same-sex marriage.160 Notably, he does not
define the right to privacy in a way that suggests all moral values are constructed
rather than discovered, as the Mystery Passage arguably does. Instead, hewing
closely to precedent, he interprets that right as “a right that protects certain
fundamental aspects of moral freedom: the freedom to live one’s life in accord
with one’s moral convictions and commitments.”161 This framing of the right to
privacy highlights the emphasis many religious believers place on the rights and
duties of conscience—that an agent’s subjective discernment and appropriation
of a moral obligation is experienced not as pure self-creation, but rather as a
claim that the moral order exerts upon him or her.
While the right to privacy may be “implicate[d]” by laws prohibiting samesex marriage, Perry insists that the right is not necessarily “violate[d]” by
them.162 Additional analysis is necessary. The judgment of violation depends on
whether the state has a compelling interest for enacting such laws. This step of
evaluation does not limit compelling interests to considerations susceptible to
cost-benefit analysis. Perry recognizes the place of “morality-based
objecti[ons]” to same-sex marriage, which turn on the conviction that sexual
activity between members of the same sex is immoral as well as “non-morality
based objecti[ons],” which he defines as entailing no such conviction.163
In his view, falling in the latter category are public policy initiatives
dedicated to preserving “the health of the institution of traditional (i.e., oppositesex) marriage” and “protecting the welfare of children”—both weighty
objectives.164 But he maintains that “no credible argument supports the
proposition that the exclusion policy serves either objective.”165 Perry’s
hypothetical justice does not hide the fact that judging involves, well, judgment.
Others may and will disagree with his judgment. But because he has so carefully
159
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explained the nature, focus, and presuppositions of the judgment involved, those
who disagree are not excluded from further conversation—indeed, they know
precisely where to take it up.
What about morality-based objections to same-sex marriage? Significantly,
Perry does not dismiss them out of hand. He writes that “[e]xcluding same-sex
couples from civil marriage obviously serves the government objective of not
taking a step that would legitimize conduct that many believe to be immoral:
same-sex sexual conduct.”166 Perry’s hypothetical judge does not argue that
these beliefs are benighted or wrong. Instead, he simply maintains that the
arguments for the immorality of same-sex sexual conduct are sectarian and
therefore cannot trump the right to privacy.167 Even here, however, Perry shows
that he understands those who disagree with him on their own terms. Quite
significantly, he does not reduce religiously infused moral beliefs to a crude
divine command ethics. He notes that many religious believers do not think that
sexual activity between persons of the same sex is wrong because God forbids
it; instead, they believe God forbids it because it is immoral.168
Why, then, is it sectarian to believe that same-sex sexual activity is morally
wrong? While he does not say so explicitly, Perry tacitly finds the answer in the
meaning of the term—the Latin word secare means to cut.169 To be a sect is to
be cut off from the larger community. On this view, sectarianism produces a kind
of political factionalism. Consequently, Perry does not look at the pedigree of
the argument against same-sex relations in the manner that many public reason
theorists do (e.g., whether they are based in scripture or reason). Instead, he
focuses on the nature and social location of the people who hold to those
arguments here and now.170 Perry invokes John Courtney Murray’s remarks to
Cardinal Richard Cushing on contraception: “Same-sex marriage has received
official approval by various religious groups within the community. It is difficult
to see how the state can refuse to countenance, as contrary to public morality, a
relationship that numerous religious leaders and other morally upright people
approve as morally good.”171
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Perry’s approach here, like Murray’s over half a century ago, is practical,
not ideological. Unlike the Glucksberg test, it does not overwhelmingly
privilege the moral perspectives dominant two centuries ago. Unlike the Mystery
Passage, it does not separate autonomous self-creation from moral responsibility
or divorce the exercise of autonomy from communal context and communal
values. Moreover, it recognizes that no moral norms are self-interpreting, even
moral norms that are embedded in normative texts such as religious scriptures
or those that are judged consonant with human nature and human social life.
Interpreting those norms requires full debate and discussion, particularly in a
democratic society such as our own.
Focusing on a current, stable, and growing consensus about values allows
the Supreme Court to avoid extremes and (as Bickel said) to help shape a
national consensus without imposing one.172 For example, unlike the Mystery
Passage, Perry’s approach would allow the Court to hold that polygamy is not
protected by a right to privacy, since it remains subject to broad-based moral
opposition, which encompasses secular feminists and religious conservatives.
Unlike the Glucksberg test, Perry’s approach would not threaten to sweep away
Eisenstadt v. Baird, which conferred constitutional protection on the right of the
unmarried to use contraception.173 His approach recognizes that we are the
constitutional heirs of the Founding Fathers. They are our ancestors, but they are
not our brothers and sisters with whom we are called to make a family here and
now.
CONCLUSION
I will conclude this long, appreciative essay by picking a small bone with
Michael Perry. As I noted earlier, Perry highlights the distinctive features of his
constitutional theory by drafting hypothetical Supreme Court opinions on
controversial cases.174 What I want to highlight now is that he does not pen his
opinions in his own name but under a pen name, which is “Justice Nemo.”175 In
Latin, “nemo” means “nobody” or “no one.” So, Perry’s stirring hypothetical
opinions are written by Justice Nobody.
But that can’t be right. Nor can it be consistent with Perry’s theory overall.
In fact, the overarching point of Michael Perry’s entire body of work is that no
human being is “nobody.” Every human being is somebody or someone. Perry’s
172
173
174
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political morality reflects his convictions regarding the inalienable dignity of
each and every human being, which he interprets through the lens of Article 1
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.176 Taken together, Perry’s
writings defend the proposition that “no human being is less worthy than any
other human being–of being treated ‘in a spirit of brotherhood.’”177 Every human
being is a socially situated someone or somebody—a brother or sister in our
human family—who has rights and duties because of their identity, needs,
relations, and roles.
So, no one is actually “Nemo,” not even a hypothetical justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States. I would therefore urge Perry to allow Justice
Nemo to retire after a long and distinguished service and to confirm a new,
vigorous Justice Aliquis to his hypothetical bench. In Latin, “aliquis” means
“someone” or “somebody.” I look forward to reading Michael Perry’s next set
of hypothetical Supreme Court opinions—under the nom de plume of Justice
Aliquis, or Justice Somebody. There remains a lot of hard judicial work for
Justice Aliquis to do.
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PERRY, supra note 154, at 29–30.
Id. at 56.

